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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON CAMBODIA

INTRODUCTION

1. In my letter of 8 August 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/22945), I stated that it was my intention to proceed with the necessary arrangements for the dispatch of a survey mission to Cambodia as soon as possible. In his reply dated 14 August 1991 (S/22946), the President of the Security Council informed me that the members of the Council agreed with the proposal contained in my letter.

2. The purpose of the present report, which has been prepared in the light of the survey mission's report, is to recommend to the Security Council that it authorize the establishment of a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which would assume its functions as soon as the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict is signed. Negotiations on the draft Agreement, the text of which was communicated to the Secretary-General by the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia on 8 January 1991 (S/22059), are now at an advanced stage, and it is envisaged that the Agreement will be signed around the end of October 1991.

I. REPORT OF THE SURVEY MISSION

3. The mandate of the survey mission was to evaluate the modalities of control and an appropriate number of United Nations personnel to control the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance and to submit recommendations for the establishment of a mine-awareness programme in Cambodia, pursuant to the requests of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia conveyed to me on 16 and 17 July 1991 by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, President of the Supreme National Council. The mission was also instructed to bear in mind the communiqué dated 18 July 1991 of the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the permanent members of the Security Council (S/22889, annex).

4. The mission was led by my Military Adviser, Major-General Timothy Dibuama, and consisted of six military officers made available by Member States and six

civilian staff members of the Secretariat. The mission visited the region from 19 August to 4 September 1991, after which it returned to New York to prepare its report.

5. The main points in the mission's report are as follows:

(a) The modalities for the control of the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance have already been worked out and are described in annex 2 to the draft Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement prepared by the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the permanent members of the Security Council (S/22059);

(b) In order to evaluate the appropriate number of United Nations personnel to implement those modalities, it would be necessary to obtain all the information referred to in article I, paragraph 3, and article VII, paragraph 3, of that annex;

(c) Certain of the Cambodian parties informed the mission that they were not at that stage ready to provide to the United Nations some of the information that would be required, and the mission was not in a position to obtain other necessary information;

(d) As a result, it was not possible for the mission to evaluate the modalities for the control of the cease-fire and the cessation of outside military assistance. The mission was also unable to begin concrete preparations for the implementation of the military aspects of the mandate foreseen for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) once a comprehensive agreement is concluded;

(e) As regards the mine-awareness programme, the mission concluded that it should initially be concentrated in the north-western part of Cambodia and areas likely to be resettled by refugees on their return;

(f) Such a programme could best be provided by a small team of military personnel, who would form part of the proposed advance mission.

II. UNITED NATIONS ADVANCE MISSION IN CAMBODIA

6. At the consultations on Cambodia that took place in New York on 20 and 21 September 1991, I informed the Co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the permanent members of the Security Council that, initially, the United Nations could assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the present cease-fire by deploying in Cambodia a small advance mission consisting mainly of military liaison officers in order to help them to address and resolve any violations or alleged violations of the cease-fire. Such an advance mission could be envisaged as the first stage of the good offices mechanism foreseen in the second paragraph of article 9 of the draft Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.

7. This information was welcomed at the New York consultations and it was suggested that I should proceed with the development of a plan along those lines. Accordingly, I recommend that the Security Council should now decide to authorize the establishment of UNAMIC on the basis described in the following paragraphs.

8. UNAMIC would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The mission would be led in the field by a civilian Chief Liaison Officer, appointed by the Secretary-General, who would exercise authority over all elements of UNAMIC. Command of the military elements of UNAMIC would be entrusted to a Senior Military Liaison Officer designated by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Senior Military Liaison Officer would report to the Secretary-General through the Chief Liaison Officer. The Secretary-General would report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of UNAMIC. All matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Mission would be referred to the Security Council for its decision.

9. UNAMIC would consist of civilian liaison staff, military liaison officers, a military mine-awareness unit and the necessary support personnel, who would mostly be civilian but could include some military. The military personnel of UNAMIC, who would be unarmed, would be provided by Member States at the request of the Secretary-General. The contributing countries would be selected in consultation with the parties and with the concurrence of the Security Council, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation.

10. The Mission would become operational immediately after the signature of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. The duration of the Mission's mandate would extend from the signature of the Agreement until the establishment of UNTAC by the Security Council and the adoption of its budget by the General Assembly. At that time, UNAMIC would be absorbed into UNTAC, and the good offices functions being carried out by UNAMIC would be continued and expanded by UNTAC during the first phase of the cease-fire referred to in article I, paragraph 1, of annex 2 to the draft Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. It is expected that UNAMIC will merge into UNTAC less than six months after the signature of the Agreement; in case of delay the mandate for UNAMIC might need to be extended beyond six months, subject to review by the Security Council at that time.

11. In addition to his responsibilities in relation to UNAMIC, the Chief Liaison Officer, assisted by the civilian liaison staff, would have responsibility for liaison with the Supreme National Council on the preparations for the deployment of UNTAC and on other matters related to the role of the United Nations in the implementation of the Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement.

12. The task of the military component of UNAMIC, in its good offices role, would be to facilitate communications between the military headquarters of the

four Cambodian parties in matters relating to the cease-fire. To that end, UNAMIC would establish its headquarters in Phnom Penh and would deploy liaison teams to the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties. It would have its own communications network linking its headquarters and the five liaison teams. It would use its good offices, including the passing of messages between the parties and arranging meetings between them, in order to resolve difficulties, restore the status quo and determine measures to be taken to avoid any recurrence of violations.

13. In addition to his responsibilities in relation to the military elements of UNAMIC, the Senior Military Liaison Officer would undertake the tasks foreseen in article II of annex 2 to the Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement. The Mixed Military Working Group referred to in that article would be used, as appropriate, to facilitate fulfilment of the tasks of the military component of UNAMIC.

14. In its mine-awareness role, UNAMIC would deploy small teams of military personnel with experience in training civilian populations on how to avoid injury from mines or booby traps. Initially, the teams would give priority to populations living in or close to areas of recent military confrontation. In due course, this initial programme would be expanded into those foreseen in the draft Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement, giving priority, in consultation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas. UNAMIC activities in this field would need to be carefully coordinated with the mine-awareness programme begun earlier in 1991 for Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in the camps along the Cambodia/Thailand border and with an information programme inside Cambodia which is to be launched shortly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

15. In order to carry out the above tasks, UNAMIC would need to be assured of the cooperation, at all times, of all the Cambodian parties. It would have to have freedom of movement and communication and the other rights and facilities that would be necessary for the performance of its tasks. UNAMIC and its personnel would also have to be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In order to confirm the commitment of all the Cambodian Parties to undertake the necessary steps to enable UNAMIC to carry out its functions, I would initiate consultations on a draft Agreement on the usual lines with the Supreme National Council as soon as the Security Council had taken the decision to authorize the establishment of UNAMIC. It would also be necessary to conclude with the Government of Thailand an agreement on the status of UNAMIC personnel whose duties might require them to enter that country.

16. It is estimated that in order to carry out the mandate recommended in the present report, UNAMIC would require 8 civilian liaison staff, 50 military liaison officers, 20 other military personnel to form the mine-awareness unit, and approximately 75 international and 75 local civilian support staff. In addition, a military communications unit of some 40 persons could be provided

by Australia as a voluntary contribution. An air unit of four utility helicopters and one fixed-wing aircraft would also be needed.

17. I would envisage that UNAMIC would be deployed progressively and in phases. In the first phase, the Chief Liaison Officer, with the Senior Military Liaison Officer and his staff, certain civilian advisory and administrative staff and the necessary support and logistic elements, would be deployed to Phnom Penh within 10 days of the signature of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement. The second phase would take place as soon as the necessary vehicles, generators, accommodation, etc. had been procured and delivered to the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties, whereupon the military liaison teams would be deployed together with the necessary administrative and support elements. As soon as possible thereafter, the mine-awareness unit would be deployed.

18. I shall, as soon as possible, submit a statement of the financial and administrative implications of this recommendation as an addendum to the present report. Meanwhile, it is my duty to inform the Security Council that, given the ravaged state of Cambodia's economy and infrastructure, it would be possible to obtain in Cambodia almost none of the equipment, supplies and services that the Mission would need. United Nations-provided support elements would inevitably, therefore, have to be extensive. It would also be necessary to send by air-freight to Cambodia a limited amount of the vehicles, communications, accommodation, generators, etc., required for the first phases of deployment.

III. CONCLUSION

19. Recent weeks have seen encouraging progress towards completion of the negotiations on a comprehensive political settlement to the long and cruel conflict in Cambodia. The international community is unanimous in wanting to see that process brought to an early and successful conclusion. I am convinced that the deployment of the advance mission recommended in the present report would help to maintain the momentum and reduce the risk of the process being disturbed by untoward developments in Cambodia. It would also demonstrate the determination of the United Nations to help the Cambodian parties and people resolve their differences in a peaceful and democratic manner.